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TEXT OF AUTHORITIES 
1. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-97 (1990): 
(1) Any employee sustaining an injury arising out of and in 
the course of employment shall provide notification to his 
employer promptly of the injury. If the employee is unable 
to provide notification, the employee's next-of-kin or 
attorney may provide notification of the injury to the 
employer. 
(2) Any employee who fails to notify his employer or the 
Commission within 180 days of the injury is barred for any 
claim of benefits arising from the injury. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a) (1994). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Was it proper for the Board of Review to determine that 
Jacobsen's "work activity" supported the legal cause of her 
injuries after inventing its own notion sua sponte of what her 
"work activity" was? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Board's application of Allen v. Industrial Com'n.. 729 
P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), to the facts of this case is a mixed 
question of law and fact subject to intermediate "reasonable and 
rational" review. Sisco Hilte v. Industrial Com'n. of Utah, 766 
P.2d 1089 (Utah App. 1988). 
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PRESERVATION OF ISSUE AT ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL 
The issue was raised at R. 68-71. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The applicant, Jessica D. Jacobsen, worked as a waitress for 
the petitioner Hilton Hotel from January 16 to August 1992. 
(Hilton Hotel and Pacific Reliance Insurance will be collectively 
referred to as "Hilton"). (R. 2-3, 61-2) (A copy of the Findings 
of Facts and Conclusions of Law and Order is attached as 
"Addendum A"). She was a part-time employee. (R. 1-3). 
Before working at Hilton, Jacobsen had a pre-existing 
history of medical problems with her neck and cervical spine. (R. 
78-9) (A copy of the Order on Motion for Review is attached as 
"Addendum B"). She was involved in a gymnastics accident while 
she was a teenager, resulting in a head injury and broken arms. 
(R. 157). In 1971 she was diagnosed as having a congenital 
unstable back. (R. 215). She sustained a neck injury in 1982 
from an automobile accident. (R. 158). The next year she was 
diagnosed with degenerative disc disease. (R. 216). 
Little more than a week before she began working at Hilton, 
on January 6, 1992, Jacobsen visited her chiropractor, Dr. Van 
Slooten. (R. 216, 438) . She complained of back pain, numbness in 
her limbs and fingertips, and a popping sensation in her back. 
(R. 216, 438). 
On May 6, 1992, Jacobsen was lifting a tray from the service 
counter at Hilton when she experienced neck and back pain, a 
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clawing sensation in her hand, and a popping sensation in her 
back.1 (R. 63, 78, 210). She lifted the tray properly and 
lifted it about a foot and a half upwards. (R. 64). Jacobsen 
changed her estimate of the tray's weight at various times during 
her pursuit of benefits, guessing that it weighed anywhere from 
thirty to fifty-five pounds (R. 118, 243). However, Jacobsen's 
supervisor, Susie Buecher, witnessed the May 6 incident and 
observed the tray Jacobsen was carrying. (R. 190). Ms. Buecher 
then weighed a comparable tray of food and found it to weigh 16.5 
pounds. (R. 195-6). 
Jacobsen went to Workcare the next day, where two treating 
physicians diagnosed her problem as degenerative disc disease. 
(R. 147). She sought another opinion from Dr. Craig McQueen, who 
agreed with the diagnosis and placed her in physical therapy 
until July 15, 1992, when she returned to work. (R. 61, 147-8). 
Claiming that she was unable to perform her work, Jacobsen 
left employment with Hilton permanently on August 29, 1992. 
(R. 62-3). She applied for workers' compensation benefits, which 
Hilton denied. Jacobsen then commenced this proceeding with the 
Industrial Commission, describing her "accident" as lifting the 
tray on May 6. (R. 1). She later affirmed this description of 
Jacobsen claims that she also felt back pain on April 19, 
1992, as she was lifting a tub of dishes at work. (R. 61). 
Nevertheless, Jacobsen did not report this alleged incident to 
her employer as required by Utah Code Ann. §35-1-97. (R. 61, 62, 
118). This alleged incident therefore cannot be considered in 
Jacobsen's claim for benefits. 
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her accident in her Memorandum in Opposition to Hilton's Motion 
for Review. (R. 76). 
Hilton argued at the hearing before the Administrative Law 
Judge ("ALJ") that Jacobsen's pre-existing condition contributed2 
to her May 6 injury, warranting the application of the higher 
causation standard in Allen v. Industrial Comm'n., 729 P.2d 15 
(Utah 1986).3 (R. 198-9). The Administrative Law Judge declined 
to apply the Allen standard and awarded Jacobsen benefits. 
(R. 60-7). 
Upon Hilton's Motion for Review, the Board of Review found 
that Hilton had shown that Jacobsen's pre-existing conditions did 
contribute to her workplace injury.4 (R. 78-9). Thus, the Board 
2Hilton also produced evidence that Jacobsen's pre-existing 
conditions constituted the sole cause of her permanent 
impairment, relying on an independent medical examination of 
Jacobsen performed by Dr. Louis Schricker in 1993. (R. 210). 
Dr. Schricker noted that Jacobsen's work activity only aggravated 
her pre-existing conditions temporarily and did not cause any 
permanent impairment. (R. 217-8). 
3Jacobsen argued that her injury on May 6 was caused by her 
work and not by any pre-existing condition. In support of this 
argument, Jacobsen introduced a letter written to her attorney by 
Dr. Reichert, who examined her in 1993 for the purpose of 
obtaining an impairment rating. (R. 114, 154, 208-9) . Dr. 
Reichert states without explanation in his letter that "the cause 
of the patient's current symptamology is lifting injury from 7 
May 1992." (R. 208). Dr. Reichert's letter does not mention 
that he considered or had access to Jacobsen's prior medical 
history (R. 2 08), and Jacobsen is unsure whether Dr. Reichert 
knew of her prior medical history. (R. 155-7). 
4Hilton produced a supplemental medical report from Dr. 
Louis Schricker stating that Jacobsen's pre-existing conditions 
were the major cause of her temporary incapacity on May 6. 
(R. 72-3) . 
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determined that the Allen case test does apply and that Jacobsen 
has the burden of proving that her work activity constituted both 
the legal and medical cause of her injury. (R. 78-9) . 
However, rather than addressing whether the May 6 incident 
of lifting the tray amounted to unusual stress or trauma so as to 
constitute the legal cause of her injury, the Board of Review 
ignored the May 6 incident that had previously been the focus of 
the case. Instead the Board injected a new theory into the case, 
one which had never before mentioned by the parties or examining 
physicians: that Jacobsen's actual "accident" was her "cumulative 
work-related exertion." (R. 79). Specifically, the Board 
declared that Jacobsen's "repetitious lifting of loaded serving 
trays" constituted exertion beyond that experienced in life's 
usual activities and thus supported the legal cause of her 
injury. (R. 79). The Board then affirmed the ALJ's award of 
benefits based on the Board's own conclusion that Jacobsen had 
satisfied the Allen requirement of legal causation. (R. 79). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Board of Review cannot affirm an award of workmens' 
compensation benefits based upon a theory never raised by the 
parties, never presented as evidence and never suggested by 
examining physicians. Yet the Board did precisely that by 
concocting the sua sponte notion that Jacobsen suffered from 
cumulative work-related exertion and then declaring that it 
supports the legal cause of her injury. Jacobsen still has not 
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met her burden of proving that her work activity legally caused 
her injuries, despite the Board's attempt to invent a favorable 
theory of legal causation for her. This Court should therefore 
reverse the Board's decision awarding Jacobsen benefits. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE BOARD IMPROPERLY DETERMINED 
THE ISSUE OF LEGAL CAUSE BY BASING 
ITS DETERMINATION UPON A SUA SPONTE NOTION 
A. The Allen Test Applies In This Case To Require Proof 
That Jacobsen's Work Activity Legally Caused Her Injury. 
An injury occurring during working hours is only compensable 
if the employee can prove that work-related exertion or trauma 
contributed to or caused the injury. Allen v. Industrial Com'n., 
729 P.2d 15, 24 (Utah 1986). When an employee brings a pre-
existing condition to the workplace, as Jacobsen did, she must 
meet a two-part test under Allen to prove that the work caused 
her injury. Allen, 729 P.2d at 25-7. The second part of this 
test, medical cause, is not contested in this appeal and thus 
will not be discussed. 
The first part of the Allen causation test compels an 
applicant to show that her work activity constituted the legal 
cause of her injury. Initially, the "work activity" of the 
employee must be delineated. Next, the agency must decide 
whether that activity amounted to unusual, extraordinary exertion 
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when compared to nonemployment life. Price River Coal Co. v. 
Industrial Com'n., 731 P.2d 1079, 1082 (Utah 1986). 
The Board correctly concluded that the Allen test applies to 
Jacobsen's claim since her pre-existing condition contributed to 
her injury. However, it acted improperly by ignoring the 
parties' impression of what Jacobsen's work activity was and 
substituting its own notion of cumulative trauma. 
B. The Board Improperly Attempted To Meet This Higher 
Causation Standard For Jacobsen By Fashioning Its Own Idea Of 
What Her Work Activity Was. 
1. THE CUMULATIVE TRAUMA NOTION WAS NEVER MENTIONED IN THIS 
CLAIM UNTIL THE BOARD CHOSE TO BASE ITS JUDGMENT UPON IT. 
Addressing the first portion of the legal cause requirement, 
designating the work activity, the Board announced that the 
repetitive lifting of serving trays constituted her work 
activity. The Board thus injected into Jacobsen's claim for the 
first time the suggestion that cumulative activity of her job 
effectively became her accident. 
Neither Jacobsen nor Hilton took the position at any time 
during the pendency of her claim before the Commission that 
repetitive lifting contributed to or caused her injuries. Such a 
notion was never pled nor otherwise asserted. It was never 
addressed at the hearing before the ALJ nor was any evidence 
presented to support or refute it. Jacobsen first described her 
accident in her Application for Hearing as the lifting of the 
tray on May 6; she stuck to this description throughout the 
proceedings, including in her Opposition to Hilton's Motion for 
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Review. Her counsel did not suggest at the hearing before the 
ALJ that she was proceeding on a theory of repetitive lifting; he 
instead argued that there was no evidence of a pre-existing 
physical condition, that lifting a tray was unusual compared to 
nonemployment activity, and that her injury aggravated pre-
existing psychological problems. (R. 203-5). Accordingly, the 
ALJ delineated Jacobsen's accident as her lifting of the tray on 
May 6, not as the repetitive lifting of trays over time. (R. 45-
6) . 
Since the parties never contended that repetitive lifting 
caused Jacobsen's injuries, it is not surprising that the 
evidence before the ALJ and the Board did not present a case of 
cumulative trauma. There is no evidence of how many times she 
lifted trays during her employment at Hilton, how much each tray 
weighed, or how many times she lifted a tray each night. There 
is no evidence of how much of her employment duty each night was 
devoted to tray lifting, whether co-employees helped her carry 
trays to tables, or how long she held a tray above her shoulder 
on average while transporting it to a table. Rather than dealing 
with a complete description of all her nightly employment duties 
over time, Jacobsen's direct and cross examination focused on her 
May 6 lifting incident (R. 118-9, 139-143), and culminated with 
her admission on cross examination that she originally sustained 
her injury on May 6. (R. 136) . 
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Additionally, none of her several examining physicians ever 
mentioned that her injuries might be traceable to repetitive 
lifting of trays. Dr. Schricker focuses on her May 6 injury when 
stating that her work activities only caused temporary 
aggravation of her pre-existing condition (R. 217-8), while Dr. 
Reichert contends that the cause "of the patient's current 
symptomatology is lifting injury from 7 May 1992." (R. 208). 
The medical panel that examined her after the hearing also did 
not suggest that she might have suffered from cumulative trauma 
of lifting trays repetitively. (R. 48-59) . 
Despite the parties' focus on the May 6 lifting and the lack 
of any insinuation in the evidence that Jacobsen's injuries were 
traceable to cumulative trauma, the Board nonetheless changed 
Jacobsen's work activity to "the repetitious lifting of loaded 
serving trays."5 (R. 79). It offered no supportive facts for 
5A possible explanation for the Board's insistence upon 
introducing a theory of cumulative trauma despite lack of 
supporting evidence is that it thought it was required to 
consider cumulative trauma as a matter of course in every 
worker's compensation case involving the Allen test. The Board 
quotes Nyrehn v. Industrial Comm'n., 800 P.2d 330 (Utah 1990), 
out of context, for the proposition that Jacobsen had to 
demonstrate that her cumulative work-related exertion exceeds 
normal nonemployment exertion. (R. 79). In Nyrehn, the parties 
had actually broached and debated the issue of cumulative trauma, 
and there was evidence of cumulative trauma to the employee 
involved. Nyrehn. 800 P.2d at 331. While cumulative trauma was 
therefore a relevant legal issue for the Nyrehn court to 
contemplate, Nyrehn does not instruct that cumulative trauma is a 
consideration to be thrown perfunctorily into every workers' 
compensation case that happens to deal with Allen causation. 
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this new inference, leaving it unclear what evidence, if any, the 
Board relied upon to support its cumulative trauma notion.6 
2. THE BOARD'S SUA SPONTE IDEA OF CUMULATIVE TRAUMA 
IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE AWARD OF BENEFITS. 
The Board hinged its judgment upon a notion that was never 
raised by the parties or suggested by the evidence. Adjudicative 
bodies must be responsive to the issues as framed by parties when 
rendering judgments because they lack authority to render a 
decision on issues not presented for determination. Combe v. 
Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1984). 
This Court recently extended the limitation on sua sponte 
decision making to administrative tribunals in Chevron U.S.A. v. 
State Tax Com'n. . 847 P.2d 418 (Utah 1993) .7 The petitioners in 
Chevron were notified by the Property Tax Division of the 
Commission that taxes on their refineries would be centrally 
6Hilton disputes the Board's unsupported inference of 
cumulative trauma. To the extent that this inference is arguably 
factual as opposed to a mixed inference of law and fact, Hilton 
ostensibly has a duty to marshal the evidence in support of 
cumulative trauma. Nonetheless, when an agency fails to disclose 
the evidence or logic it might have employed in making a factual 
finding, marshalling the evidence is impossible. See Woodward v. 
Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991) (findings must include 
enough subsidiary facts to show clearly the evidence upon which 
they are grounded or the marshalling effort is futile); Adams v. 
Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n.. 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991) 
(factual findings should be sufficiently detailed to disclose the 
steps by which ultimate factual conclusions are reached; absent 
this, appellant wishing to challenge agency's factual findings 
cannot marshal evidence). 
7This Court again cautioned administrative tribunals against 
taking sua sponte action in dicta in Middlestadt v. Industrial 
Com'n.. 852 P.2d 1012, 1013 n.2 (Utah App. 1993). 
-10-
assessed by the state. They initiated formal adjudicative 
proceedings with the Commission, which held that the taxes should 
be centrally assessed pursuant to subsection (a) of a particular 
statute in Utah's Property Tax Act. Although the parties had 
raised and debated whether subsection (d) of that statute could 
apply to require central assessment, subsection (a) was never 
mentioned as a ground for central assessment until the Commission 
relied upon it in its final decision. This Court noted that the 
subject matter of subsection (a) arose only as part of the 
parties' presentation of evidence before the Commission and was 
never directly discussed as authority for central assessment. 
Id. at 421. Because the Commission sua sponte raised and decided 
an issue that had not been raised by the parties, this Court 
reversed the Commission's decision. Id. at 420-1. As this Court 
observed, 
[p]reservation of the integrity of the adversarial system of 
conducting trials precludes the court from infringing upon 
counsel's role of advocacy. Counsel is entitled to control 
the presentation of evidence, and should there be a failure 
to present evidence on a claim at issue, it is generally 
viewed as a waiver. 
[T]he interests of justice are not enhanced when the court 
exceeds its role as arbiter by reaching out and deciding an 
issue that would otherwise be dead, it not having been 
litigated at the time of trial. 
Id. at 421, quoting Girard v. Appleby. 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 
1983) . 
This Court also faulted the Commission for merely concluding that 
subsection (a) applied without developing subsidiary facts 
supporting the application. Id. at 421 n.9. 
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The same problems with sua sponte decision making detailed 
in Chevron arise here due to the Board's creation of the 
cumulative trauma theory. First, the Board placed itself in the 
improper role of advocate for Jacobsen by devising a theory of 
recovery that she could have raised but did not. Second, because 
it announced the cumulative trauma theory for the first time on 
final agency judgment, Hilton was deprived of the right to 
compile legal authority countering the theory or to present 
testimony against it at the hearing before the ALJ. Hilton could 
not rebut the notion that repetitive lifting caused Jacobsen's 
injuries because the Board's unprecedented action foreclosed 
debate. 
The third flaw in deciding Jacobsen's claim based on a 
theory that the parties did not raise is that the Board's theory 
lacks substantial evidence. The Board simply states without 
explanation in its Order that repetitive lifting of trays caused 
Jacobsen's injuries and that cumulative trauma existed in her 
case. It did not, as it could not, offer medical evidence to 
support this notion; none of her examining physicians, including 
those on the medical panel, attributed her injuries to 
progressive work-related trauma. The Board did not, as it could 
not, offer testimonial evidence, because cumulative trauma was 
never an issue at the hearing before Judge Allen. Lacking any 
proof, the Board did not enter subsidiary factual findings to 
bolster, much less explain, its bare announcement that repetitive 
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lifting caused her injuries. In a similar case, Price River Coal 
Co, v. Industrial Com'n., 731 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1986), the 
Industrial Commission had ruled that a worker's employment 
activities amounted to unusual exertion and caused his death, but 
failed to explain what those employment activities were. The 
Supreme Court reversed the agency's ruling, noting that 
the "finding" of unusual exertion and stress is nothing more 
than a conclusion.... We cannot affirm such a mixed 
conclusion of fact and law when its necessary premises are 
not evident. 
Price River Coal, 731 P.2d at 1083. 
Likewise, this Court should reverse the Board's award of 
benefits in this case because the basis for its judgment lacks 
substantial evidence. Grace Drilling Co. V. Board of Review, 776 
P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989) (substantial evidence standard 
requires agency to support findings with more than scintilla of 
evidence). 
C. Even If The Board's Sua Sponte Action Was Proper, This 
Court Can Conclude That Repetitive Lifting Of Trays Is Not 
Extraordinarily Stressful. 
After improperly defining what Jacobsen's work activity was, 
the Board completed the legal cause inquiry by stating that 
repetitive lifting constitutes unusual and extraordinary 
activity. This Court is free to reach the opposite conclusion 
that this does not constitute unusual and extraordinary activity; 
the Board's determination that a work activity exceeds demands in 
nonemployment life is accorded no particular deference. Nyrehn 
v. Industrial Com'n. of Utah, 800 P.2d 330, 333 n.5 (Utah App. 
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1990) . Thus, even if this Court concludes that the Board was 
justified in inventing the cumulative trauma theory, it can still 
reverse the Board's decision if it feels that lifting trays is 
not extraordinarily demanding. 
The Board inappropriately determined that Jacobsen had met 
her burden of showing her work activity legally caused her injury 
as required under Allen. It exceeded its authority in fashioning 
a sua sponte "work activity" that lacks evidentiary support in 
the record. Since Jacobsen has not demonstrated that her work 
activity constituted the legal cause of her injury, reversal of 
the award of benefits is warranted. 
POINT II 
JACOBSEN'S WORK ACTIVITY 
AS DEFINED BY THE PARTIES DID 
NOT CONSTITUTE THE LEGAL CAUSE 
OF HER INJURIES. 
The parties defined the work activity that allegedly caused 
Jacobsen's injury as the lifting of the tray on May 6. It is 
undisputed that Jacobsen lifted the tray in the correct manner 
and that she lifted the tray about one and a half feet to her 
shoulder. The parties disputed the weight of the tray; the ALJ 
did not enter a finding as to the weight of the tray, but noted 
that Jacobsen testified it weighed thirty pounds while Hilton 
maintained it weighed 16.5 pounds. (R. 62). 
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Given these facts, Jacobsen's lifting of the tray on May 6 
was not extraordinarily stressful under the Allen test.8 The 
Utah Supreme Court in Allen listed several examples of typical 
nonemployment activities to gauge whether a given employment 
activity is unusual. Included in these examples were lifting and 
carrying baggage for travel and lifting a small child to chest 
height. Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. The Court went on to quote with 
favor a well-known workers' compensation treatise stating that 
lifting twenty-pound objects such as bags of golf clubs was not 
unusual or extraordinary. Id. at 26 n.8, quoting Larson, 
Workmen's Compensation §38.83 at 7-280-81. Considering the 
Supreme Court's broad position in Allen on how much an individual 
normally lifts in nonemployment life, the tray Jacobsen lifted on 
May 6 was not extraordinarily heavy and could not have legally 
cause of her neck injury. 
Despite the Board's inappropriate handling of the legal 
cause issue in this claim, this Court has authority to determine 
the legal cause issue properly. Jacobsen's actual work activity 
did not legally cause her injury as required under Allen, 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED 
Jacobsen has failed to meet her burden of showing that her 
work activity constituted the legal cause of her neck injury. 
8Although neither the ALJ nor the Board determined whether 
lifting a tray weighing 16.5 to thirty pounds constitutes 
extraordinary activity, this Court can evaluate that question. 
Nyrehn, 800 P.2d at 333, n.5. 
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The Board's attempt to create a favorable "work activity" for her 
is a nullity; it invented that work activity in disregard of the 
parties' consistent position and in disregard of the evidence 
before it. Since Jacobsen's lifting of a tray on May 6 was not 
extraordinarily stressful, her work activity did not constitute 
the legal cause of her injury. Based upon the foregoing, Hilton 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Board's award 
of benefits to Jacobsen. 
DATED t h i s 3>c^ day of CTc^oiorii / 1 9 9 5 . 
SNOW# CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By. kl P. Qn^ Stiuart L. Poelman 
Julianne P. Blanch 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 3d 
day of January, 1995. 
M. David Eckersley, Esq. 
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM A: 
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
_c?^2.L 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 92-817 
JESSICA D. JACOBSEN, * 
* 
Applicant, * 
* 
VS. * FINDINGS OF FACT 
* CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
HILTON HOTEL and/or UNITED * AND ORDER 
PACIFIC RELIANCE INSURANCE, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East Third South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
August 20, 1993, at 8:30 o'clock a.m., the same 
being pursuant to Order and Notice of the 
Commission. 
BEFORE: Timothy C. Allen, Presiding Administrative Law 
Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The applicant was present and represented by M. 
David Eckersley, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants were represented by Stuart L. 
Poelman, Attorney at Law. 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing in this 
matter, the case was referred to a Medical Panel appointed by the 
Administrative Law Judge. The Medical Panel Report was received 
and copies were distributed to the parties by registered mail. 
Fifteen (15) days having elapsed since the mailing of said Panel 
Report, and no objections having been received thereto; the Medical 
Panel Report is hereby admitted into evidence. 
Being fully advised in the premises, the Administrative Law 
Judge is prepared to enter the following, 
JESSICA JACOBSEN 
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FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant herein, Jessica D. Jacobsen, started working for 
the Salt Lake Hilton Hotel in January of 1992, as a cocktail 
waitress. The applicant worked at the Room At The Top restaurant. 
On April 19, 1992, the applicant contends that she was lifting a 
heavy tub of dishes into the kitchen, when she experienced mid-back 
pain, and pain between her shoulder blades accompanied with spasm. 
The applicant apparently did not report that injury to anyone and 
continued working. 
On May 6, 1992, the applicant was in the process of lifting an 
oval food service tray from the service counter, when she 
experienced clawing in her left hand and neck pain. The applicant 
had described the tray as weighing thirty pounds, however, the 
applicant7s immediate supervisor testified that the service tray 
with four meals on it would have weighed 16.5 pounds, including the 
tray. At the time of her injury, the applicant's immediate 
supervisor was approximately two or three feet away, and noticed 
that the applicant had to let the tray back down to the service 
counter. The applicant called out to her supervisor for 
assistance, and informed her that "I can't feel my arm." The 
applicant started having neck pain, and could hardly move her head. 
An accident report was filled out by the supervisor, and an 
incident report was filled out by the applicant. 
On May 7, 1992, the applicant was sent to WorkCare by her 
employer, and, at that facility, it was recommended that she have 
6 - 8 weeks of physical therapy. The applicant wanted a second 
opinion, so she contacted her employer and informed them that she 
would be seeking additional medical opinion. The applicant having 
previously been treated by Dr. Craig McQueen, reported to Dr. 
McQueen on May 12, 1992. Dr. McQueen had previously performed knee 
surgery on the applicant, and after examining the applicant, Dr. 
McQueen concurred with the recommendation of physical therapy. 
The applicant received physical therapy, and was eventually 
released from that care. The applicant returned to work on or 
about July 15, 1992, and testified that she was fine at first. 
However, by mid-August, her symptoms had returned, especially 
following the lifting that was required by her job. The applicant 
was unable to function at full capacity. On or about August 20, 
1992, she and her immediate supervisor discussed the problems the 
applicant was having doing her job, and, at that time, it was 
requested that the applicant resign, since she was unable to 
perform her duties due to the physical problems it was causing her. 
The applicant requested some additional time, so that she could get 
JESSICA JACOBSEN 
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her personal affairs organized. The applicant also testified that 
no light duty was offered to her and also that there is no light 
duty work that can be performed by a waitress. The applicant last 
worked on August 29, 1992. 
On September 25, 1992, Dr. McQueen gave the applicant a 5% 
permanent partial impairment as the result of her industrial 
injury. In October of 1989, the applicant was seen by Dr. Gant for 
a psychological evaluation at the request of the Division of 
Rehabilitation Services. 
The applicant received chiropractic treatment from Dr. Van 
Slooten following her injury of May 6, 1992, but those treatments 
were discontinued after the physical therapist that the applicant 
was receiving treatment from advised her that she should 
discontinue forceful chiropractic manipulations. The physical 
therapist advised the applicant that she needed nonforceful 
treatment. The applicant changed her chiropractic care to Dr. Troy 
Giles, and he treated her with spinal touch trigger point therapy, 
and other treatment modalities of a nonforceful nature. 
Dr. Giles then referred the applicant on to Dr. Reichert for 
neurological care, after the applicant was complaining of tingling 
in her upper extremities following her chiropractic adjustments. 
Dr. Reichert had the applicant receive an MRI and a CT scan, and 
gave the applicant a 20% whole person rating. 
In January of 1993, the applicant started massage therapy 
school, but later had to discontinue that program when she was 
informed that she had a carcinoma of her cervix and uterus. The 
applicant resumed that school program the first part of July of 
1993. 
The applicant7s present complaints are that she has numbness 
in her hands and problems with her grip, which is exacerbated when 
she gardens, sews, or does any lifting. She also complains of 
decreased range of motion in her neck and neck pain. 
In 1982, the applicant was involved in a car accident in 
Pennsylvania. A month or so afterwards, the applicant experienced 
the inability to move her neck, and so she reported to Dr. 
Soderberg, who informed her that it was not uncommon for a whiplash 
injury to become symptomatic a month later. Dr. Soderberg treated 
her conservatively, and the applicant testified that she had no 
further problems with her neck until January 1992. At that time, 
the applicant testified that she fell while skiing, and had 
JESSICA JACOBSEN 
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tingling in her hands for one or two days, and then had problems 
with the paraspinous muscles of her mid and low back. She 
testified that that she treated with Dr. Van Slooten one or two 
times weekly as part of a maintenance program. 
On cross-examination, the applicant testified that in January 
of 1993, she had the first of four surgical procedures on her 
carcinoma. The applicant testified further regarding the events of 
May 6, 1992. She testified that she had to lift the tray 
approximately 1-1% feet off the service station onto her left 
shoulder. She stated that as she did so, she felt a pain in her 
neck and a clawing in her left hand, which caused her to drop the 
tray onto the station. The applicant also stated that she was 
leaning over as she lifted the tray. She stated that she had no 
had no prior problems similar to this in her neck. 
At age fourteen, the applicant sustained a head injury while 
engaged in gymnastics. The applicant was attempting a triple flip 
off the parallel bars, when she missed, and as a result fractured 
both of her arms and had a concussion. The applicant reiterated 
that following the ski accident in January of 1992, she had 
tingling of her fingers for a couple of days. She also testified 
that she saw Dr. Van Slooten on May 5, 1992, for an adjustment of 
her back. 
The Human Resource Director of the Hilton Hotel was called and 
testified that the applicant did not report any industrial injury 
to her on April 9, or April 19, or August 20, 1992. She testified 
that the applicant informed her that she was terminating her 
employment because she was unable to perform her work. 
The applicant's immediate supervisor was called and testified 
that she witnessed the applicant's injury, and that the applicant 
lifted correctly and routinely. She also testified that the 
applicant was having problems and treatment for her back, starting 
with the first day she started at the Hilton Hotel. She also 
testified that the applicant reported no injuries to her on April 
9, or April 19, 1992. She also testified that there was no 
accident on August 20, 1992, but rather, that she and the applicant 
sat and talked about the fact that lifting the trays was 
detrimental to the applicant and that it was hurting her 
physically. 
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The applicant's immediate supervisor also testified credibly that 
the applicant did not miss any work before May 6, 1992, due to her 
back. She also testified forthrightly that she observed no 
limitations on the part of the applicant as far as doing her job 
before May 6, 1992. 
Based on the foregoing, I find that the applicant was not 
suffering from pre-existing problems with her neck or clawing of 
her left hand prior to May 6, 1992. However, the evidence does 
support a finding that she was having difficulties with her low 
back. The Nyrehn case requires that: " An employer must prove 
medically that the claimant 'suffers from a preexisting condition 
which contributes to the injury.' (Note omitted) In this case I 
have been directed to no evidence, by the defendants, upon which 
"the critical factual finding that [Jacobsen's] preexisting 
condition contributed to her injury." Accordingly, with respect to 
the neck injury of May 6, 1992 the higher legal causation standard 
of Allen does not apply. Therefore, the applicant is entitled to 
a finding that she sustained a compensable industrial accident on 
May 6, 1992. 
The defendants referred the applicant to Dr. Schricker, for an 
independent medical examination. Dr. Schricker found that the 
applicant's work activities of May 1992, resulted "In an 
aggravation of her well documented pre-existing condition of osteo-
arthritis." Dr. Schricker went on to find that the applicant was 
temporarily disabled as the result of those activities for 
approximately ten weeks or until July 16, 1992. Dr. Schricker gave 
the applicant a 5% permanent partial impairment rating due to the 
osteoarthritis, and it would appear that the doctor also found that 
1% of that 5% impairment would be due to the industrial events, 
although the report is not clear. 
Because of the disputed medical issues, the case was referred 
to the Medical Panel for its evaluation. The Medical Panel found 
that the applicant was temporarily totally disabled from the 
industrial accident of-.May 6, 1992 until July 15, 1992. The Panel 
also concluded that the applicant has a 2% permanent impairment due 
to the accident of May 6, 1992, and that the accident did not 
result in any aggravation of the applicant's pre-existing 
psychiatric condition. Having reviewed all of the evidence oon the 
file, I find that the Panel's findings are well supported by the 
evidence, and I adopts the Panel's findings as my own. 
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On May 6, 1992 the applicant was single and was earning $2.13 
per hour plus tips. The payroll records indicate that the 
applicant was paid wages based on hours worked and tips earned. 
Usually, Section 75 of the Act requires that the average weekly 
wage be based on the number of hours worked by an employee per 
week. However, in this case because of the payment of tip income, 
it seems more appropriate to utilize the following provision: 
35-1-75. Average weekly wage - Basis of computation. 
* * * 
(g) (i) If at the time of the injury the wages are fixed 
by the output of the employee, the average weekly wage 
shall be the wage most favorable to the employee computed 
by dividing by thirteen the wages, not including overtime 
or premium pay, of the employee earned through that 
employer in the first, second, third, or fourth period of 
thirteen consecutive calendar weeks in the 52 weeks 
immediately preceding the injury. 
Applying the foregoing statute to the facts of this case, I 
find that the applicant did not quite work the full 13 weeks of the 
first quarter of 1992. Rather, she worked 10 weeks in that quarter 
beginning with the payroll period ending January 26, 1992 and 
ending halfway through the payroll period ending April 5, 1992. 
Adding the gross wages received by the applicant beginning with the 
$113.43 payment for the period ending 1/26/92 and ending with one-
half (1/2) of the $208.67 payment (i.e. $104.34) for the period 
ending 4/5/92, results in total wages to the applicant of 
$1,618.55. Dividing the total wages by 10 weeks results in an 
average weekly wage of $161.85 per week, which entitles the 
applicant to compensation benefits of $108 per week, when rounded 
to the nearest whole dollar. 
Based on the findings of the Panel the applicant is entitled 
to temporary total compensation for the period May 7, 1992 through 
July 15, 1992, or a total of 10 weeks at the rate of $108 per week 
for a total of $1,080. The applicant is also entitled to 6.24 
weeks of permanent impairment benefits at the rate of $108 per week 
for a total of $673.92 for her 2% impairment due to the industrial 
accident. 
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CONCLUSION OF LAW: 
Jessica Jacobsen sustained a compensable industrial accident 
on May 6, 1992 while employed by Hilton Hotel, and is entitled to 
benefits therefor. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Hilton Hotel and/or United 
Pacific Reliance pay Jessica Jacobsen compensation at the rate of 
$108 per week for 10 weeks for a total of $1,080, for temporary 
total disabilty resulting from the industrial accident of May 6, 
1992. These benefits shall be paid in a lump sum with 8% interest 
from July 16, 1992. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Hilton Hotel and/or United Pacific 
Reliance pay Jessica Jacobsen compensation at the rate of $108 per 
week for 6.24 weeks for a total of $673.92, for the 2% permanent 
impairment resulting from the industrial accident of May 6, 1992. 
These benefits shall be paid in a lump sum with 8% interest from 
July 16, 1992. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that that Hilton Hotel and/or United 
Pacific Reliance pay M. David Eckersley, attorney for applicant, 
the sum of $351 plus 20% of the interest awarded to the applicant, 
for services rendered in this matter. Said fee to be deducted from 
the award herein and remitted directly to counsel's office. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Hilton Hotel and/or United Pacific 
Reliance pay all medical expenses incurred as the result of the 
industrial accident of May 6, 1992. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in.writing within-.thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is 
timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the 
date of filing with the Commission, in which to file a written 
response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-46b-
12(2), Utah Code Annotated. 
DATED this 4th day of February, 1994. 
Timothy Or. Allen 
Presiding Administrative Law Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on February 4, 1994, a copy of the 
attached Order in the case of Jessica Jacobsen was mailed to the 
following persons at the following addresses, postage prepaid: 
M. David Eckersley, Atty., 175 E. 400 S., #900, SLC, UT 84111 
Stuart Poelman, Atty., P O Box 45000, SLC, UT 84145-5000 
Jessica Jacobsen, 2144 S. Highland Dr., #150-154, SLC, UT 84106 
United Pacific Reliance Insurance, Vickie Holland, 
P O Box 526198, SLC, UT 84152-6198 
BY DIRECTION: 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By ^Jv^^ U-&JU^>~>/ 
Tim A l l e n / ^ ^ 
ADDENDUM B: 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR REVIEW 
?-'/-*/ 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
JESSICA D. JACOBSEN, * 
* 
Applicant, * 
* ORDER ON MOTION 
VS. * FOR REVIEW 
* 
HILTON HOTEL and * Case No. 92-0817 
PACIFIC RELIANCE INSURANCE, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* 
Hilton Hotel and its insurance carrier, Pacific Reliance 
(referred to jointly as "Hilton" hereafter) asks The Industrial 
Commission of Utah to review the Administrative Law Judge's 
decision awarding workers' compensation benefits to Jessica D. 
Jacobsen. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over 
these Motions For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-82.53 and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission generally adopts the findings of fact set forth 
in the ALJ's decision, except to the extent such findings are 
amplified or corrected below. 
Ms. Jacobsen began working as a waitress for Hilton during 
January 1992. During the course of each shift, she was frequently 
required to lift trays filled with dishes and meals. On April 19, 
1992, as she was lifting a heavy tub of dishes, she experienced 
pain in her back. She. continued to work. On May 6, 1992, as she 
was lifting a tray with meals to her shoulder, she experienced pain 
in her back, neck and left hand. 
Ms. Jacobsen was examined by a physician who referred her to 
physical therapy. She returned to work in mid-July, 1992. After 
one month, she again began to experience neck pain in connection 
with lifting. During late August 1992, she resigned because she 
could not perform her work duties. 
Ms. Jacobsen has been examined by a medical panel appointed by 
the ALJ. The panel concluded that she suffered a 6% whole person 
impairment due to problems associated with her cervical spine. Two 
thirds of that impairment preexisted her work at Hilton and one 
third resulted from her work at Hilton. 
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Ms. Jacobsen was also examined by Dr. Schricker on behalf of 
Hilton. Dr. Schricker concluded: "There is no question that her 
work activities or (sic) early May 1992 resulted in an aggravation 
of her well-documented pre-existing condition of osteoarthritis." 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The ALJ concluded that Ms. Jacobsen did not suffer from 
preexisting neck problems prior to May 6, 1992. In its Motion For 
Review, Hilton disputes the ALJ's conclusion and argues that Ms. 
Jacobsen suffered from a preexisting neck condition that 
contributed to the problems she experienced while working at 
Hilton. According to Hilton's argument, since Ms. Jacobsen had a 
preexisting injury, she must meet the "legal causation" test of 
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 770 P.2d 912 (Utah 1988). 
Based upon the reports of the medical panel and Dr. Schricker, 
it appears that Hilton is correct in its argument that Ms. Jacobsen 
suffered from a preexisting osteoarthritis condition in her neck. 
Therefore, under Allen, ibid., she must demonstrate that her 
"cumulative work-related exertion exceeds the normal level of 
exertion in nonemployment life." Nvrehn v. Industrial Commission, 
800 P.2d 330 (Utah 1990). 
After considering the demands of Ms. Jacobsen's employment, 
the Commission concludes that the requirements of her work, and in 
particular the repetitious lifting of loaded serving trays, exceeds 
the normal level of exertion customarily experienced in 
nonemployment life. Consequently, even though Ms. Jacobsen 
suffered from a preexisting condition, she has satisfied the Allen 
requirement of legal causation and is entitled to the workers' 
compensation benefits awarded by the ALJ. 
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ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, the Commission denies the Hilton 
Hotel's Motion for Review. The Commission affirms the award of 
benefits as set forth in the ALJ's decision. It is so ordered. 
Dated this /^ L day of September, 1994. 
NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by 
filing a request for reconsideration with the Commission within 20 
days of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may 
appeal this Order by filing a Petition For Review with the Court of 
Appeals within 30 days of the date of this Order. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON 
MOTIONS FOR REVIEW in the case of Jessica D. Jacobsen v. Hilton 
Hotel and Pacific Reliance Insurance,. Case No. 92-0817, was mailed, 
first class postage prepaid, this /-fe/.day of September, 1994 to the 
following: 
M. DAVID ECKERSLEY 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
175 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 900 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
STUART POELMAN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P. 0. BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-5000 
VICKIE HOLLAND 
UNITED PACIFIC RELIANCE INSURANCE 
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